



Al-Aqsa Mosque and The Third Palestinian Intifada

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ABSTRACT

Objective – This paper highlights the threats that Al-Aqsa Mosque is exposed from the Zionist entity. It seeks to recognize the gradual Judaizing attempts that are being implemented on the factual level. In more comprehensive frameworks, the paper also addresses the Judaizing of Jerusalem since occupying the sacred city in 1967. There is no doubt that these Zionist practices have led to igniting a third Intifada. This paper examines the evolution of active power's map and their interactions, which includes: The Israeli occupation authority, Jewish religious groups, the Palestinian Authority, the Palestinian militant factions, Fatah and Hamas, The Palestinian people, the Arab regimes, and the Arab peoples. The paper is interested in analysing the Palestinian political differences and the evolution of political situations in the Arab region. The paper also addresses the impact of the Arab situations on the Israeli political behaviour and the extent to which the region is passing through an appropriate opportunity toward more Zionist violations and accelerating the Judaizing of the Holy City, which include the Islamic sanctities and the Palestinian suburbs of Jerusalem, the native people of the city. The paper also covers the developments and the new phenomena in particular, and at the forefront the rise of Palestinian Intifada's phenomenon which called: the third Intifada.

Methodology/Technique – The study reviews previous literature.

Findings – The paper concludes at the end of the analysis to provide a vision for the future of contemplative Al-Aqsa mosque, runs from two visions; one is pessimistic and the other is optimistic. Every approach has its private determinants, on the safe level in particular, which related to the Palestinian, Arab and Islamic reality.

Novelty – Accordingly, this paper will analyse four topics: Judaizing of Jerusalem, threats of Judaizing Al-Aqsa Mosque, the rise of the Intifada's phenomenon, and the future of Al-Aqsa Mosque.

Type of Paper: Review

Keywords: Mosque; Aqsa Mosque; Jerusalem; Arab Israeli Conflict; Judaize; Intifada; Theoretical Models; Islamic Political Thought; Political Theory; Political Science.

JEL Classification: F51, F53.

1. Introduction

This study explores the Zionist threats to the Aqsa Mosque. It is important to determine what the Aqsa Mosque means, and what the difference between it and the Haram Sharif, The Dome of the Rock, the Marwani Mosque, and The Qibli Mosque. In general, there are two meanings of the Aqsa Mosque, the specific meaning and the general meaning. In its general meaning, the Aqsa mosque means the Haram Sharif of Jerusalem with all components, walls and what is inside, including the Qibli mosque, the Dome of the Rock mosque, the

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women's mosque, the Marwani mosque, and other monuments including the schools, graveyards, Ablutions, yards, gardens, terraces, gates and walls. The Aqsa mosque in the specific meaning, is the roofed building in which the prophet Mohammad, Peace be Upon Him, lead the prophets in prayers during the Isra and Mi'raj night. It is one of the buildings of the Haram Sharif, known as the Qibli mosque. Thus, when the media points to the Dome of the Rock mosque as the Aqsa mosque, that is true considering it a part of the Aqsa mosque in the broadest meaning, but this should not mean skipping the Aqsa Mosque in its specific meaning or what is called the Qibli mosque. For more details, see: (Sharab, 1996, pp. 403-432). These threats are evident in the form of implementing gradual Judaizing attempts. The study, in a broader framework, covers the Judaizing of Jerusalem, which is, sometimes, imposed in the accelerated pace whenever the circumstances allow, in aims to detach the city from its Arabic-Islamic attributes. To identify to Judaizing Jerusalem historically and violating the International legitimacy decisions by the Occupation Authority, see: (Al-Farra, 1984, pp. 6-9, 11-14). This, in turn, makes it easier to Judaize the Aqsa mosque, the last Arabic-Islamic bastion, from their point of view. To identify status of Jerusalem in Islam, see: (Al-Husseini, 1969, pp. 57-71).

The study also explores the development of the active powers and their interactions in this regard, including the Israeli occupation authority, the Jewish religious groups, the Palestinian Authority, armed Palestinian factions, Fatah and Hamas, insurgents, the Palestinian people, Arabic systems, and Arab nations. It focuses on the Palestinian political conflicts and the development of the political conditions in the Arab region, and their reflections on the political Israeli behavior in terms of considering the regional situation as a golden chance for more Zionist encroachment, and accelerating the pace of Judaizing the sacred city including the Islamic sanctities and the Palestinian Jerusalemite neighborhoods, the aboriginals.

The study also covers updates and latest phenomena in this regard. On top of these the Palestinian Intifada, characterized by rising and escalation, and latency and fading, according to the status quo of the nation and the Intifada environment, in what thereafter became known by the Third Intifada (Beaumont, 2015) in the media and among researchers. The study then concludes by introducing an insightful vision of the future of the Aqsa mosque from two viewpoints; a pessimistic and another optimistic one. Each viewpoint possesses its limitations, especially on the level related to the Palestinian, Arabic and Islamic status quo. The current study, then, explores four major points: Judaizing Jerusalem, threats of Judaizing the Aqsa, rising of the Palestinian Intifada, and the future of the Aqsa mosque.

2. Methods

In addition to the research problem and hypothesis the paper will use a theoretical model about the political role of the mosque which was suggested from the author in 1994. One of the most important purpose of this study is to develop this model.

2.1 Research Problem

The research problem is focused on the negative Israeli practices and the recognition of its impacts on the rise of the Palestinian Intifada. The research problem is also focussed on developing the theoretical model; "system of relation between mosque and ruling authority", which has appeared in 1994, to be appropriate for applying on a relationship between a colonial authority and a very important national religious institution like Aqsa mosque.

2.2 Hypothesis

The paper assumes the following hypotheses:

- The more the Israeli violations against Aqsa mosque, the more likely the rise of Palestinian Intifada again.
- The more the Israeli violations against Aqsa mosque, the more likely the escalation of political role

for Aqsa mosque.

- Occupation authority is determined to gradually demolish the Aqsa Mosque and build the Third Temple in its place.
- The more the weakness of Palestinians, Arabs and Muslims in the world, the greater negative practices of the occupation authority against Aqsa mosque.

2.3 Methodology

The paper is interested in applying the theoretical model: “System of the relationship between the mosque and ruling authority”, as an analytical tool, which will be applied on the relationship between Aqsa mosque and Israeli occupation authority (AbulQaraya, 1994, pp. 311-325; AbulQaraya, 2015, pp. 252-256). The following three figures show the detail:






Figure 1. The Theoretical Model
System of Relationship Between Mosque and Ruling Authority



3. Results

The key findings of this paper are:

- There is a positive relationship between Aqsa mosque and the Palestinian Intifada.
- There is a positive relationship between Israeli Judaizing actions and escalating of the Palestinian Intifada.
- There is a positive relationship between the weakness of Palestinians, Arabs, and Muslims, and the Israeli actions of Judaizing the mosque.

On the other hand, the paper on the realistic level recommends the following:

- Future of Aqsa Mosque, Jerusalem, and residents of Jerusalem, depend on the unity of Arabs and Palestinians through overcoming their differences and problems and prevent, in their affairs, the intervention of regional powers and the majority.
- Aqsa Mosque is in imminent danger, and that is a cause for Muslims, Arabs and Palestinians to take these Israeli actions and steps seriously.
- Even their passiveness, weakness, dispersions, and complacency continued one day they will wake up with something very gravely leading to a dire consequences.
- Zionists will be built and ready pretexts they always have.
- The forces of global domination will not let them down if they make the maximum division and build a synagogue, or even demolish Aqsa Mosque and the establishment of the third Temple.
- There is no way but to unite and sit-rope of Allah and not to disperse.

The paper also, but on the theoretical level, recommends the following:

- The political researchers, those who are specialist in Islamic political thought or Islamic political theory in particular, are invited to apply this theoretical model on another mosque case study.
- Developing this theoretical model should take into consideration the distinguish between the national authority and the colonial authority. The type of relationship with the mosque is completely difference in both authorities.

4. Discussion

To validate the hypothesis, confirm the importance of the results, and achieve an in-depth analysis to the case study, the paper will discuss four main subjects: Judaizing of Jerusalem, Threats of Al-Aqsa Judaizing, The rise of the phenomenon of the Intifada, and The future of the Aqsa mosque. For the second subject, threats of Al-Aqsa Judaizing, the paper will discuss two points: first, the field actions, focusing on: control, intrusions, division, excavations, prohibiting renovation and rebuilding, restrictions and complications, and preparations for building the temple. Secondly, the next steps, focusing on: taking full control over the Aqsa, spatial division, building a Jewish synagogue in one of the Aqsa squares, closing the Aqsa Mosque, destroying and demolishing the Aqsa, and building the Third Temple on the ruins of Aqsa. For the third subject, the rise of the phenomenon of Intifada, the paper will discuss: the prefaces and reasons, the Intifada act and people of Intifada, tools and means, Zionist reactions, the Intifada's environment, and the attributes of the Intifada.

4.1 Judaizing of Jerusalem

Since the occupation of Jerusalem in 1967 and joining in 1980, the Zionist entity gradually started to follow the policy of Judaizing land, building stones and human. This policy is still ongoing to this day, despite listing Jerusalem in the "World Heritage in Danger" list because of the Israeli acts and assigning a personal

representative of the UNISCO to pursue the Jerusalem file (Najm, 2008, pp. 11-32). Its pace increases in times of negotiations and compromises as well as in times of Arab world weakness. The Judaizing policy is based on the principle of shrinking the Palestinian existence (Halabi et al., 1997, p. 96) and intensifying the Zionist existence, through sub-policies including: land expropriation and joining policy, demolition and downsizing buildings policy versus the settlements and Zionist settlement units-building policy, evacuation and forced displacement, and the policy of cracking down on Jerusalemites versus the settlement and replacement policy for the Jews. The occupation authority has geographically concluded the Jerusalem cause in a plan produced by various Israeli agencies:

In terms of land, these agencies started preventing Jerusalemites from the beginning to use about 87% of the East Jerusalem land, leaving them with only 13% (Arnaout, winter 2016, p. 179). They also expanded the borders of Jerusalem in a settlement expansion plan that identifies the boundaries of the Greater Jerusalem city as a united capital of the Israeli entity, free from Palestinians presence, which means a comprehensive Judaizing of the city in the future.

On the level of buildings and real estates, they used various pretexts to demolish the Jerusalemites houses, under the pretext that they are not licensed or that the owner has lost a residence, and another in the pretext of punishment of martyrs, bombers, or rebels and their relative Jerusalemites. The Israeli municipality in Jerusalem classifies 20,000 Palestinian houses in the city (almost 39% of all houses) as illegal, justifying this by the inability of their owners to obtain licenses to build. On the other hand, the municipality encouraged occupancy of Palestinian houses inside the districts, specifically in the old city, Salwan, Ras Al Amoud, AlTor, and Sheikh Jarrah (Arnaout, winter 2016, p. 179). The occupation authority planted settlement neighbourhoods in and about eastern Jerusalem, as well as inside the Palestinian neighbourhoods themselves. The Elad settlement group has played a great role in the Israeli government plans in this regard. These Israeli policies confronted the Palestinians with three options: paying expensive prices or rentals for apartments in the city, take the chances in building houses without prior licensing, or moving to regions behind the wall, either to houses in the Jerusalem neighbourhoods isolated by the wall or in the west bank (Arnaout, winter 2016, p. 179).

The Israeli master plan of the Jerusalem municipality aims at completely isolating the Palestinian neighbourhoods from eastern Jerusalem, and then, joining the eastern and western Jerusalem together with the settlement entities around them to produce the Great Jerusalem, a pure Jewish city (Al-Jaaba, 2015, p. 19). In this regard, the opposition leader, Yitzhak Herzog, insists on implementing a separation plan by isolating 28 Palestinian neighbourhoods. Meanwhile, Jerusalem Mayor Nir Barakat suggests joining the Jerusalem neighbourhoods to the Palestinian Authority and completely separating them from Jerusalem. This means, in turn, excluding 200 thousand Jerusalemites of the Greater Jerusalem administrative domain. They also claim that Jerusalem citizens present with no desire to join the Palestinian Authority and prefer the Israeli rule, in an attempt to buy more time for the completion of the Jerusalem Judaizing plan. According to the structural plan guidelines, this is implemented in order to enforce the "Jerusalem is basically the capital of Israel" (Al-Jaaba, 2015, p. 19; Arnaout, winter 2016, p. 178).

On the level of people, the occupation authority attended to the policy of emptying Jerusalem of the Jerusalemites, the aboriginals of the city (Arnaout, fall 2015, p. 206; Arnaout, spring 2016, p. 159). To identify the legal status of the Jerusalemites and their properties from the point of view of international law, see: (Ad-Dayil, 1983, pp. 154-164). The occupation authority practiced cruel acts aiming at reducing their numbers under the umbrella of various claims, actions and pretexts (Halabi et al., 1997, p. 96; Salama, 2015, p. 118), while, on the other hand, replacing them with Jews in pre-planned manner. The legal status of Jerusalemites from the Israeli perspective has been determined as residents rather than citizens. The residence has been made conditional to Land property, thus, whoever loses residence, loses his land. The identification cards were withdrawn from 120 thousand Jerusalemite because of the change in the administrative domain of Jerusalem (Arnaout, winter 2016, p. 179; Al-Jaaba, 2015, p. 15), arrests and choking on their living means, their living resources depressed, markets diminished, poverty rates escalated among the middle class. The Jerusalemite

neighbourhoods were totally surrounded by settlements, the Jerusalemites suffered a housing crisis in whatever was left of their lands. They became unwanted foreigners, suspects and aliens in their own city. They were banned from entering many regions in their own homeland, and intentionally harassed with pre-planned pettiness and unprecedented abuse (Arnaout, spring 2016, p. 162). The occupation authority, subjected them to strict conditions, high-rate taxes, withdrawn their identification cards, exiled them to other cities of the west bank, banned from returning to their sacred city, and their old houses. It demolished what had been left of their houses, preventing them from maintenance, building, expansion, or renovation, confiscating their land and properties as well as confiscating the properties of exiled people (Leddawi, 2015).

Their foreignness increased with the authorities of the occupation, closing the gates of East Jerusalem, the entry of the army to the streets, setting up checkpoints on the entrances, checking the Jerusalemites identities and searching their cars, banning some from passing even to their homes in the East Jerusalem, while arresting whoever they wanted of the people passing the checkpoints. The entrenches of the Jerusalemite towns have been closed with huge concrete blocks that obstruct passage and interrupt the traffic flow causing traffic jams on long paths, a practice that causes oppression and impatience (Leddawi, 2015).

Furthermore, the eyes of Israelis watch Palestinians who are walking or passing by or even riding the bus, provoking Palestinians, insulting and mocking them with bad words of obscenities on mothers, honor, lineage, religion and messenger. Some even throw stones or shouts asking them to leave while threatening them by killing and death, claiming that this is not their city and they have no right to live there. The military patrols stop every Palestinian, treating them as suspects, they may even shoot at them, injure or kill them before discerning that what they bear is nothing but bread or fruit, and what is in their hand is nothing but their cell phones or their house or car keys. The Arabic cars are all treated as suspicious and doubted, their owners are not allowed to pass, and whenever a driver tries to speed, pass, change lane, or stop, the Israelis, the police or settlers, they fire at them extensively, even if the driver stepped out of his vehicle and walks with his hands up. If the driver is a woman, they treat her similarly, as if she is intending to run over them (Leddawi, 2015).

Whenever the Palestinians of occupied East Jerusalem get involved in facing an Israeli occupancy act, they find themselves threatened by a new one. The Israeli officials do not hide the fact that the ultimate target is to reduce the Palestinian pollution in the city so the latter becomes Jewish. With the unveiling of the agreement between the right and left Israeli wings in their approach of getting rid of tens of thousands of Jerusalemites, through picking whole neighbourhoods of the Great city of Jerusalem (Arnaout, winter 2016, p. 178), the milestones of implementing the largest settlement plan to isolate what is left off from the Palestinian surrounding, in endless efforts to efface its Palestinian national culture and identity. This concurred with the escalation in targeting its Islamic Sanctities of the Aqsa mosque and the Doom of the Rock, regardless of the escalation of Jewish assaults on Christians and their churches (Leddawi, 2015).

By 2016, the population of Jerusalem, both eastern and western halves, was 829,000, of which 307,000 (39%) were Palestinians, according to the Jerusalem Center of Israeli Studies. This indicates that they exceeded the 22% risk limit determined by Israel shortly after occupying the city. Such numbers are the milestones of the Israeli actions against Palestinians in the city that is based on a systematic rising policy of discrimination and exiling (Arnaout, spring 2016, pp. 159-160). About 75% of the Jerusalemites live below the poverty line, according to Ronit Sela (Maariv, 24/2/2016). There is also a huge gap between the Palestinian and the Israeli infrastructures, the eastern neighborhoods were left extremely lagging behind. For instance, only 64% of the houses are neatly connected to the water network, while the rest of Palestinians have to buy water tanks and pumps to bring water to their houses (Arnaout, spring 2016, p. 160).

All of this makes the conflict on Jerusalem and Palestine a uniquely demographic conflict (Abu Jabara, 2015) that Palestinians face with early marriage and frequent childbearing, a fact the Zionist strategic experts addressed with deep concerns.

4.2 Threats of Al-Aqsa Judaizing

Zionist practices in the Aqsa mosque exceeded the threats of Judaizing, but rather taking actual steps for Judaizing and Israelization (Abdul Karim, 1998, pp. 123-149; Jumaa, 2010, pp. 56-61; Okasha, 2010, pp. 109-112; Awad Allah, 2014, pp. 266-273), with intents to target the Islamic sanctities (Ayoubi, 2015). At the very same time, planning and preparation for future actions is ongoing. Nevertheless, these actions are implemented gradually, through which the Israeli entity uses the feelers policy as well as taming anger, fabricating pretexts, and seizing opportunities. Therefore, this study distinguishes between actual field practices that occurred in reality, and is still occurring, and the future actions that did not, taking into consideration that these actions are mere preparation, prefacing and conditioning acts; things will not be limited to this. What is coming is greater, riskier, and enormous, in the shape of what they call "The Stage of the Establishment of the Third Temple" (Al-Jaaba, 2015, p. 16).

4.2.1 Field Action

The Israeli field practices aim at changing the status of Aqsa mosque and imposing a new one are considered unprecedented aggression, flagrant violation and desecration of the Holy Sacred Mosque (Al-Bojadaini, 2015). They are also considered a violation to the International laws and decisions, a major provocation of worldwide Arabs and Muslims. For the Israeli violations of the holy places and annexation of Jerusalem from the standpoint of international law, see: (Ad-Dayil, 1983, pp. 150-154). Some development companies, in cooperation with the Department of Antiquities, built huge theaters to the south of the Aqsa, adjacent to its gates that had been open hundreds of years ago and closed during the reign of Saladin Al-Ayoubi (Abu Amer, 2015). In this regard, seven major actions that have been implemented will be discussed; control, intrusions, division, excavations, ban of reconstruction, constraints and complications, and preparations for building the temple.

4.2.1.1 Control

This, basically, involves full Israeli Authority control over all gates and yards of the Aqsa mosque, meaning a full control with an exception of the roofed buildings. In the frame of the control over gates, the Israelis check identities and prevent entry of building and reconstruction materials without prior agreement and approval by the Israeli Authorities, including the periodic maintenance. They work on converting the Aqsa yards to public yards under the control and direct supervision of the occupation municipality. They also consider them as national archeological gardens that should be handled by the Department of Israeli National Parks. They started, upon this, changing the names of streets and gates surrounding the Holy Aqsa "Al-Haram Al-Sharief", including the statement of "Temple Mount" on one of the gates (Qersh, 2015, pp. 106-107). It is noted that western journalists, researchers, and politicians began using the phrase, "the Temple Mount", and remember the Al-Aqsa Mosque as if it is based on this mountain (Margalit, 2015).

4.2.1.2 Intrusions

The phenomenon of Aqsa intrusion has become a frequent and escalated one with time since first started by Sharon and was the reason for setting off the Aqsa Intifada in 2000. The Zionist intrusions of the Aqsa nowadays are various: there are intrusions by Israeli officials such as ministers; the most famous one is that by the current Minister of Agriculture, Uri Ariel, members of The Knesset, party leaders and members; the most famous of which is the intrusion by the Likud's Youth. Military intrusions performed by the Israeli police and internal security forces (the Shin Bet) and agents of the Arabists unit and others of the security agents, in addition to intrusions by the settlers and extremist religious forces. According to an estimate, 9434 Israelis intruded the Aqsa till October 2014 (Arnaout, winter 2015, pp. 132-133).

The Israeli intrusions in the past were seasonal to the Jewish holidays, nowadays, however, they became

almost daily acts taking place between 7:30 to 11:00 am, and 1:30 to 2:30 pm (Qersh, 2015, p. 107). This was accompanied by raising the Israeli flag on the stairs of the Dom of the Rock by these groups, all of which in the middle of tight security by police officers and agents of the Mossad. There is an intention, now, to assign an officer to execute and arrange prayers in the Aqsa (Qersh, 2015, p. 107).

The Jewish, settlers and youth, have repeatedly carried arms inside the yards of the Aqsa mosque, entering with their own prayer clothes, setting of the ablutions and facilities inside its walls. The Aqsa guards confirmed that they frequently find Zionist security car wheel-tracks, entering the Aqsa yards and patrols there at night. Calling Aqsa prayers and servants with obscene words, attempting to secretly invade the mosque and carry out armed attacks inside, bringing alcohols and intoxicants to its yards frequently to desecrate it, in addition to circulating posters and drawings among Jewish schools and universities to impose the alleged temple case in their minds (Abu Amer, 2015).

4.2.1.3 Division

In light of its trials to divide the Ibrahimi Mosque as a precedence on which they rely, the occupation authorities started field prelusions(?) to divide the Aqsa through a series of frequent intrusions, either by settlers and fundamentalists or through some politicians of the Knesset and religious parties that insist on asking for their claimed rights in praying at the Aqsa Mosque. The occupation authorities started to implement a series of procedures and explorative steps. In general, they imply on the ground different kinds of division in the Aqsa mosque: age division, chronicle division, and the spatial division. The steps of division are implemented in a studied gradual manner within given chronological periods, accelerating the pace whenever they found no difficulties or serious objections from the Palestinian side, they may temporarily slow down, stop or freeze these procedures in cases of direct demonstrations or oppositions as well as a knife stabbing attack, car hits, or serious Arabic diplomatic oppositions (Qersh, 2015, pp. 103,109).

On the level of age division, the occupation authorities determine the ages of people who are allowed to practice prayers in the Aqsa and those who are not allowed to enter. They may also change their limitations according to various justifications and pretexts. For instance, they sometimes ban prayers who are less than 60 years old from entering the mosque, others who are less than 50, or 30 years old, justifying this by claims of intelligence and information about their role in disturbing security (Qersh, 2015, p. 106). The claimed argument through which the occupation authorities justify taking this measure is that youth who are less than forty years in age throw stones and engage in fights with Israelis who intrude the Aqsa. However, the actual reason behind this is that they try to bring the whole issue as a rule so they can control its spaces, in order to evacuate them from prayers to clear the way for the largest possible number of settlers and Jews to enter with no problems, fights or confrontations (Amer, 2015).

The Israeli procedures were not confronted with any serious Palestinian, Arab, or Islamic reactions that may force the occupation authorities to step back from implementing them. The Liberation Organization (Tahrir), as well as the national authority, parties, and melicia, including both Hamas and Jihad movements, did not take this matter seriously, and dealt with it as an inevitable matter that does not require field rejection, with all rising consequences. In addition, it can be said that this stage is pacing reasonably toward implementation with no sound objections. All what Palestinians do is that they pray in the streets leading to the Aqsa mosque, to the gates of Sahirah, Asbat, or Amoud (Column). Sometimes, sporadic fights occur between the young and the Israeli police at the entrances of the gates, and then are unwrapped. The occupation authorities, also, ban women from entering the sacred places if they are under thirty-five from 7:00 am till 11:00 am as well as other times that they decide (Qersh, 2015, p. 106).

On the level of chronicle division, this is the easiest for the occupation authority, and most implementable with least objection or oppositions. The hours and days of weeks are divided between Palestinians and Jews, with determined hours for the Jews to enter to the Aqsa mosque to pray and worship. With other hours determined for Palestinians. The occupation authorities reached to a result that the most suitable hours for Jews, temporarily, with least reactions are 7:30 – 11:30 am, that is after the Fajr prayers and before the Duhr

prayers of Palestinians, and between 1:30 and 2:30 pm (before Asr prayers), with exception of Friday. These intrusion hours are the times that witness confrontations between Palestinians and Israeli police. The occupation authorities succeeded in imprinting these times in the minds of the majority of public and Aqsa visitors as well as the media, something that became a norm for them. It does not stop with these actions, but rather includes campers and ablutions scholars from entering to the Aqsa in the abovementioned hours, which means emptying the mosque yards off young people who are capable of confronting the Jewish groups who invade the mosque, and subsequently avoiding such confrontations and stone throwing. It can be said that this stage is steering as planned with the least objection, confrontations, oppositions, and Arabic and Islamic denunciation and stone throwing. This has become a routine, to which everyone gets used to, and is occurring on a regular daily basis (Qersh, 2015, p. 110).

The occupation authorities saw that the chronic and age divisions are practically finished, as Palestinians, militia, and parties are dealing with them with no serious or weighed confrontations, that may stop or undermine the whole project (Qersh, 2015, p. 111).

In terms of the spatial division that the occupation authorities did achieve in reality (Arnaout, Winter 2015, p. 134), it started on the geographical level of Palestine, by banning prayers from the west bank who did not get previous licenses or magnetic cards, as well as all prayers from Gaza strip from entering the mosque (Qersh, 2015, p. 106).

4.2.1.4 Excavations

It was revealed that the occupation authorities are performing new excavations under the Aqsa mosque (Bani El-Marja, 2010, pp. 233-234). The Zionist entity began in excavations in Jerusalem and in al-Haram al-Qudsi Ash-Sharif area and axes since the beginning of his hegemony. They aim to search for pathways that, they claim, where the main entrance of the second temple two thousand years ago (Al-Jaaba, 2009, pp. 16-19, 20-23), followed by celebrating a delivery of a red cow as a sign for building the alleged temple, in addition to allowing Jews to pray in the mosque (Abu Amer, 2015). The Aqsa mosque witnessed an increase rate of underground excavations. The department of the Antique Gardens finances these excavations and other excavations in this area (Al-Jaaba, 2015, pp. 22-23).

4.2.1.5 Prohibiting Renovation and Rebuilding

The occupation authority tries the best to prevent renovations to the Aqsa mosque, but rather tries to undermine it if not demolish it at all. They ban the entrance of any maintenance or renovation materials, despite the urgent need for them (Abu Amer, 2015). They prohibit the renovation and maintenance works without a government commissioner approval. In addition, they prohibited Itikaf or staying the night at the mosque (Qersh, 2015, p. 108). The Israeli police had already broken its antique windows and burnt the carpets (Al-Kamel, 2015), as well as igniting the fire in its front yard. They also fired with bullets, sound bombs, as well as tear gas at the masses of prayers (Mahmoud, 2015).

4.2.1.6 Restrictions and Complications

The occupation Israeli authorities follow the policy of complication on Palestinians who frequently visit the Aqsa mosque, putting restrictions on prayers, visitors and science students. Assaults on prayers, hitting, arrests, and banning from entering the mosque are frequently practiced. Sometimes scholars are prevented entry and science ablutions' freedom are obstructed every once in a while. In general, they make sure to obstruct the freedom of scholar groups inside the Sacred Haram Sharif. The same actions are seen with school visits for introducing to the mosque. The occupation authority threatens to use force to evacuate people defending the mosque, these are the ones who defend against the intrusions of settlers and extreme Jews. Thus, actions against them are taken, as well as banning them from entering the mosque most of the time. They also activate the judicial acts and files as well as accusing many Aqsa guards, defenders, youth, and Palestinians of

1948 with criminal judicial accusations, issuing security and judicial acts to prevent them from entering the Aqsa for periods of time that may reach a year, as well as imprisonment for varying periods. They also, for the first time in Ramadan, banned prayers entry to the Aqsa on Friday and in the Qadr night. This was during its Gaza strip attacks (Qersh, 2015, p. 106).

In contrast to these complicated practices, the occupation authorities give Zionists facilities to enter to Aqsa, especially after the current right-wing government won power led by Netanyahu, who gave them the rights to pray in it, as well as practicing their worship. It also gave and approved the daily intrusions to the yards of Aqsa by the settlers, which involved, in most cases, practicing their prayers and Talmudic rituals. It also allowed soldiers, police officers, and Mossad agents intrude the yards of Aqsa and perform various search and arrest campaigns including student arrests and defender fighting. The occupation authorities sought to create and impose a routine pattern of Jewish existence inside the Aqsa, so that people get used to, especially for Palestinian prayers (Qersh, 2015, p. 107).

4.2.1.7 Preparation for Building the Temple

The occupation authorities continue to organize Zionist conferences with participation of governmental personnels and agencies as well as Jewish activities to build the temple. Some right-Jewish conventions have announced that they already started a wider campaign that targets earning the approval and support to rebuild the alleged temple. Meanwhile, this campaign started with the participation of right-extremist groups who are seeking full Jewish control over the Aqsa, as a preparation step to rebuild and revive the alleged temple. Models have been built in the third temple and the temple treasury fund was founded. Impressionist posters embodying the temple have been distributed to school and university students. On the other hand, Jewish media who work to demolish the Aqsa such as Azza Zion Radio of the Kach movement, which openly calls Jewish youth to work on the establishment of the temple on the ruins of the Aqsa started broadcasting using chief Rabbis as their references. In addition to a new temple that resembles the old temple was built in the Araba valley area by an engineering group, designed by engineers in the US, under the supervision of Jewish Americans. This temple was placed at the disposal of the government (Abu Amer, 2015).

An integrated team of builders was recruited waiting for the zero hour to start working, at the suitable time to transfer it and put its pillars on the ruins of the mosque, building materials are ready and stored in a secret place, composed of precious stones, gold and silver foils, and artworks. Collecting the sacred stones have become a worship act to many people who are hastening to build the temple, to use them in its structure. The project will need not less than 6 million stones, brought in from the city of Beersheba, south of occupied Palestine in 1948. Religious trips from occupied Palestine and the whole world to Jerusalem were promoted to link people to it, concentrating on visiting the models of the temple that is sought to be built on the ruins of Aqsa. Groups seeking to demolish the Aqsa and those who seek building the temple are agreeing to unify their efforts, utilize their energies, and diversify their activities, making the build of the temple an issue of concern to every Jewish residing on the Palestinian land (Abu Amer, 2015).

Jewish increasingly distribute leaflets that call for expulsion of Muslims from the Aqsa mosque and building the alleged temple, as well as patrolling its yards and squares, reading Jewish books, performing abnormal acts offending the sanctity of the place. Furthermore, they call for guiding and translating for tourists and visitors that this is a Jewish place only, and that it should be demolished to build the alleged temple on its ruins, as well as grouping in its yards during their religious holidays including the Tisha B'Av, the beginning of the Jewish New Year, and other conventions (Abu Amer, 2015).

4.2.2 Next Steps

There are six potential threats to the Aqsa mosque in the future that represent acts from one side, and coming stages for the Zionist entity: Grabbing full control of the mosque, spatial division, building a Jewish synagogue inside its wall in one of its yards, partial and then full closure with various pretexts, partial destruction with

various pretexts, full-staged demolition, and building the Third temple in its ruins.

4.2.2.1 Taking Full Control Over the Aqsa

The occupation authority plans to take full control over the Aqsa from the Palestinian Waqf Department, and handing its management to official Israeli entities (Abu Amer, 2015) such as the Israeli Ministry of Religious Affairs, National Parks Department, Municipality of Jerusalem, Ministry of Jerusalem Affairs and Heritage, or the Ministerial Committee for Jerusalem Affairs. The act draft content included the division of Aqsa between Muslims and Jews, determining areas for each. The proposals claimed that the whole Aqsa area is a sacred place or Jewish temple called the Temple Mount, but because of the current conditions, Palestinians are allowed to do their prayers in there within coordinated conditions to be agreed on. The proposal also included that the southern roofed building, Al-Qibli Mosque (the Aqsa mosque in its specific meaning) is specifically to be used by Palestinians to perform their prayers and rituals (Qersh, 2015, p. 108).

4.2.2.2 Spatial Division

This study discriminates between the Zionist perspective of the spatial division of prayers according to their original areas, and the spatial division of the Aqsa area itself between Palestinians and Jews, the most serious issue. The occupation authority tries to cut about one fifth of the Aqsa areas in the eastern part parallel to the Rahma Gate Cemetery toward what the Jerusalemite call Toma Toma Gate which is very close to the Lions' Gate. The Israelis refer to the place as the Temple Mount, and say that they face obstruction from Palestinians who sit in Jewish religious places and paths, obstructing their ability to freely move in Temple Mount. They also claim that Jews cannot walk inside the mosque when Muslims sit in the Aqsa squares randomly. Thus, the Jewish organizations, in their message, required intensive measures to restrict the spread of Muslims inside the squares of Aqsa and limit their presence to the roofed buildings. This is the first step in implementing the spatial division, which begins by restricting the presence of Muslims in given places. This message was signed by twenty organizations that work for the establishment of the alleged temple, and was revised by a cohort of Rabbis and senior leaders of these organizations. The name "Temple Mount" is now the officially used name of the place after dropping the name of the Aqsa mosque from all official letters, essays and analysis stories, including transfer of events and confrontations over live broadcast (Qersh, 2015, p. 112).

4.2.2.3 Building a Jewish Synagogue in one of the Aqsa Squares

Establishment of a Jewish synagogue inside the Haram Sharif is one of the most serious Israeli attempts that threaten the future of the Aqsa mosque. Zionist success in establishing one synagogue will be, certainly, followed by more. A sub-committee of the Board of Rabbis have discussed a number of suggestions to establish a synagogue in the Haram Sharif in different places: Rahma Gate, The Omari School in the South-east corner of the Haram, and Al-Marwani Mosque (Abu Amer, 2015).

There is an actual proposal for building a Jewish synagogue on the east side. The Aqsa Foundation for Waqf and Heritage have revealed a document and a map that included a draft of a proposed project, prepared by activists of the Likud party headed by the Vice President of the current Knesset Moshe Feiglin, that included cutting some area in the eastern side of Aqsa to build a Jewish synagogue. This area comprises about one fifth of what they claim to be the Temple Mount, extending closely from the entrance of Al-Marwani Mosque through Al-Rahma Gate site ending at the Lions' Gate at the farthest north east of Aqsa. It included areas allocated for individual and group Jewish prayers; that is the area near the Rahma Gate Cemetery, in given times allocated during weekdays and others for Jewish holidays and occasions (Qersh, 2015, p. 112).

The Zionist media mentioned a Jewish group who approached the Organizing Committee in Jerusalem to approve a plan for building a synagogue inside the mosque, with total knowledge of the Prime Minister's Office. What indicates planning to build more than one synagogue is that Jewish Settlement Associations submitted a request to the government to convert the Omari School in the Northern West corner of the Aqsa

mosque, which is under the supervision of the Municipality of Jerusalem, to a Jewish Synagogue, or allowing Jews to practice their prayers in that school (Abu Amer, 2015).

4.2.2.4 Closing the Aqsa Mosque

This study contrasts two scenarios of the Zionist perspective of closing the Aqsa: one is partial and the other is complete closure. The partial closure is multi-faced, for instance, totally closing the mosque on whomever is inside and preventing any new people from entering, which is the most common practice. In addition, there is closing for given hours during the day to allow settlers and Jewish religious people to enter the Aqsa. In all cases, the different faces of closure are based on providing various pretexts, an act the occupation authority is used to. These requests to close the Aqsa was not limited to settlers and Jewish religious extremists, but rather, some Journalists also such as Ariel Kleiner, said that the Aqsa should be totally closed in the face of Muslims, and that the Awqaf should be expelled out (Abu Atta, 2016). The Israeli forces closed the Aqsa and trapped prayers preventing them from exiting the mosque, in addition to preventing the students of the Aqsa Sharei schools, totaling 500 students, from entering the mosque, as well as preventing the administrative and faculty staffs from entering the mosque and assaulting them (Al-Kamel, 2015).

Netanyahu has issued a decision to totally close the gates of the Aqsa Mosque in 30/10/2014, and banned prayers from entering in order to test the Arab and Palestinian reactions, prefacing for the spatial division. However, the results were more serious than he expected on both Palestinian and Arabic levels. Jordan, for instance, called their ambassador for deliberation, the Palestinians of 1948, Jerusalem and the West Bank have moved opposing that, forcing him to retreat and pull-back his decision (Qersh, 2015, p. 112).

4.2.2.5 Destroying and Demolishing Aqsa

In addition to the previous Zionist claims to destroy Al-Aqsa, there are various scenarios to partially destroy the Aqsa with various pretexts, or gradually-completely demolishing it (At-Tamimi, 1990, pp. 50-54). The intelligence reports presented to the Zionist government insures the existence of practical Aqsa demolition plans put by Jewish groups (Al-Naami, 2013, pp. 52-53). Some scenarios include the possibility to sneak to the Aqsa and demolish it using advanced technologies. Agents of Jewish organizations are communicating with their supporters in the United States of America to obtain equipment necessary to dig under its walls, starting from Palestinian properties close to the mosque that the Jewish organizations managed to buy during the past years (Abu Amer, 2015).

One of the Jewish organizations distributed a poster depicting a scene of military aircrafts bombing and destroying the mosque, with a text that read: "This day will soon come". The security reports warn of a more serious plan of extreme Jewish organizations that involves air strikes targeting the mosque by extremists working in the Israeli Air Force. What makes this scenario most probably applicable is that many of them are officers in the Israeli Air Force, and some special task units who are able to get whatever explosives they need from its stores, in addition to the plans of some extremist Jewish organizations to fling radioactive material that could lead to the killing of prayers (Abu Amer, 2015).

4.2.2.5 Building the Third Temple on the Ruins of Aqsa

The Zionist entity continues to hold Zionist conventions with the participation of government officials, in addition to Jewish activities to build the temple. Jewish right-wing forums announce starting wide propaganda campaign aiming at mobilizing support for extremists to rebuild the alleged temple, at the same time this campaign, with the participation of right-wing extremist groups to seeking Jewish control over the Aqsa, paving the road to rebuild and revive the alleged temple. Right-wing Jewish forums have agreed to intensify their efforts and endeavors to rebuild the sacred temple for Jews in the occupied city of Jerusalem. Some of these right-wing movements, which are active in the scope of Jewish domination and control over the Aqsa, established a special Sacred Temple Treasury Fund, which has been officially registered as an association of

Jewish endowment at the Endowment Properties Register in Ministry of Justice (Abu Amer, 2015).

It became obvious that the appointment of the alleged temple site is of crucial importance from the viewpoint of Jewish forums (Abu Amer, 2015), as in case of insuring and deciding anything in terms of location, this will allow senior rabbis to give permission to the Jews to enter the Aqsa areas. It is noticeable that accelerating or slowing down implementation is linked with the pulse feeling policy that is connected to the anger taming, various pretexts and seizing the opportunities policies. The Israeli government needs a huge dramatic event to justify the implementation of its plans. For example, it is possible, in various certain pretexts, that this event is announcing their decision to divide the Aqsa (Arnaout, winter 2015, p. 139).

4.3 The Rise of Phenomenon of Intifada

The study, in the resolution of the problematic understanding of the concept of the Intifada, sees the Intifada phenomenon in any human society is a continuous process that does not cease until cessation of colonialism and tyranny against which it started in the first place. Then, the Palestinian Intifada will continue as long as settlement and replacement colonization is present on the land of Palestine, since the rise of the first Zionist settlement in 1881, to the establishment of the Zionist entity in 1948, until this time, and the time Palestine returns in the hands of original Palestinians (Beres, 2015). With respect to the visions that Intifada may cease or what happened in 2015 was just a rebellion, not an Intifada, assuming that the conditions of the Intifada are not all met, the study sees that the Intifada phenomenon is also characterized by uptimes and downtimes, rising and fading. It is also characterized by the comprehensive geographic distribution and the comprehensive use of tools of confrontation, as well as varying Intifada acts, violence and nonviolence. However, this does not imply the occurrence of all together, leaving the possibilities open according the change in status of the conflict and the “status quo”. The Intifada phenomenon also is subject to obstacles, losses, and weak points despite the fact that it may make achievements and gains, and that it may have strengths. All this is connected to the Intifada environment that may be adverse or favorable (AbulQaraya, 2014, pp. 99, 137, 141).

It is unreasonable, then, to describe the rise of the Intifada in 1987 as first Intifada, in 2000 as the second, and in 2015 as the third, because there were many rises of Intifada before, including: Buraq Revolution in 1929, the Greatest Revolution in 1939, War of 1948, and the Palestinian Revolution 1965 (AbulQaraya, 2014, pp. 19-20). Despite this clarification about the phenomenon of the Intifada, and after the Third Intifada concept became idiomatic imposition among people, that mass media, social media, and statements by some politicians played a major role in its spread, it is fine to be used based on the aforementioned theoretical background. It is fine, too, to accept other names such as Jerusalem Intifada, Youth's Intifada, Individuals' Intifada, Knives Intifada (BBC, 2015), Run-over Intifada (Ad-Diar, 2015), Facebook's Intifada (Afaneh, 2015), and Intifada of social media. In all cases, these designations reflect the characteristics of the third intifada, in terms of its association with location, or reason of rising, or the characteristics of the people involved or the tools used.

In order to draw the main features of the Intifada rising in 2015, the study explores the following points: pretexts and reasons, the acts and actors of Intifada, tools and means, Zionist reaction, environment of the Intifada, and its features.

4.3.1 Prefaces and Reasons

Settlers abduction and burning alive the Jerusalemite kid Mohammad Abu Khdair (6/2014) (Shaham, 2016), burning Dawabsheh family's house (31/7/2015) (Abu Atta, 2016; Margalit, 2015), and the last Netanyahu's attacks on Gaza (6/2014) (The Palestinian Intifada, n.d.), Which resulted in more than 2100 martyrs, are considered prefaces of this Intifada, and expression of the occupation crimes and assaults on Palestinians. The Jerusalemites feel especially targeted as they recognize the Zionist intentions to evacuate Jerusalem of their aborigines replacing them with settlers to convert Jerusalem to a sole Jewish city in the near future, and a capital for their imposed entity on the Palestinian land.

Regardless of the common reasons of the Palestinian Intifada phenomenon, with all up and down times

from 1881 till 2016, including the subjective factors that induces its rise, i.e. the occupation and its policies (AbulQaraya, 2014, pp. 289-313), there are special reasons for its current rise. It is clear that there are two main reasons; the first is linked to the policies and procedures of Judaizing Jerusalem and the unbearable suffering of Jerusalemites, and the second is linked to the procedures and acts of Judaizing, dividing and controlling Aqsa. The study has demonstrated these reasons in details in the previous two sections. This means that the Zionist practices against land, buildings, stones and human of Jerusalem and its sanctities are the main reason for the rise of the 2015 intifada.

Some Israeli writers discuss the reasons of the 2015 Intifada considering that the Aqsa events are the reason, and that Jerusalem is the capital of the Intifada. Said that; Avi Sakharov of Hebrew website WALLA, Ron Ben-Bshai of Ynet, Nahum Barnea of Yedioth Ahronot, and Alex Fishman and Yossi Yehoshua of Yedioth Ahronot (Abu Atta, 2016). Nahum Barnea of Yedioth Ahronot sees that the reason is not the obstructed political horizon, but the lack of hope among Jerusalemites (Abdel-Hamid, 2015). Yossi Melman of Maariv reports that the reason behind Intifada is the political gap (Abbas, 2015). All these are probable true reasons, however, Israeli writers always overlook the key reasons; Judaizing, Israelization, and targeting land, buildings, and man.

4.3.2 Intifada act and people of Intifada

The third Intifada act in general varied between confrontations and sit-downs in Jerusalem and at the Aqsa gates, cold weapon and car hits, the Intifadi contributions in social media, in addition to stone throwing, explosive devices and Molotov cocktails (Newton, 2015), closing streets with burning tires and garbage containers, and some gunshots. The Palestinians, for the first time, introduced the use of firecrackers that lit up the darkness of the streets. It is noticeable that most Intifada people are young men and women, with individual initiatives. Women, through calling Allah Akbar, bothered Jews inside the Aqsa (Arnaout, winter 2015, p. 134).

The aspects of the third Intifada have commenced in the Jerusalem neighbourhoods since October 2015, when tens of masked young men started to go out every day marking the start of confrontations and combat with the Israeli occupation forces in the face of sound bombs, tear gas, and rubber bullets heavily fired by the Israeli forces on protesters. The confrontations expanded to the old city, the towns of Shuafat, Beit Hanina, Silwan neighbourhoods, Tur, Issawiya, Ras Amoud, Wadi ElJoz and Mount Scopus and Sur Baher and the Shuafat refugee camp (Arnaout, winter 2015, p. 137).

Knives and cold weapon stabs have considered the main act of the Palestinian young men under 23 years of age against extremist settlers and Israeli soldiers, who used both rubber and live ammunition to confront them (Laithi, 2015; al-Jazeera 2015). In confirmation of this, all the martyrs who have fallen were between the ages of 16 and 22 years old, with the exception of only one 27-year-old martyr (Abu Jabara, 2015). During the first three months, 200 stabs and hit and run operations were executed resulting in 24 settlers and soldier killed and another 340 wounded. A report issued by the Israeli Security Agency, Shabak, in mid-February 2016, that 50% of the perpetrators of the attacks since early October 2015 were young men less than 20 years old (Abu Aqelah, 2016, p. 61). Palestinians throw about five thousand stone every month in most of the east Jerusalem neighbourhoods onto Israeli targets according to Nir Barkat, Mayor of Jerusalem. Due to the huge increase in attacks, the Israeli Security Services became disabled or crippled (Arnaout, winter 2015, pp. 131-132), especially with the expansion of the Intifada, which started in east Jerusalem to reach the west bank and the Palestinians of 1948 (Sada al-Watan, 2015).

Mass and social media play an important role in this context. It was noticed that the attackers were affected by what the media reveals about the assaults on sanctities and Palestinian people, as well as the Palestinians affected by the news about these operations (Abu Aqelah, 2016, p. 60). Intifada men post photos of extremist Israeli threats to the Aqsa mosque and the scenes of stabs and shooting (Afaneh, 2015). Intifada commenced through Facebook and Twitter, the Palestinians started to tweet at #Intifada, where the spread of images showing Palestinians are stabbing Israelis and throwing stones on soldiers fed and fired the enthusiasm among

young people who are ready to confront. The Jerusalem Intifada Hash-tag is very popular among tweeters (Akhbar el-Watan, 2015). Activists announced through the #Intifada commenced, the commencement of the third Intifada, supporting the resistance through #Jerusalem is rising. The Palestinian young people returned to stabbing and car-hitting Israeli settlers and soldiers following the later frequent intrusions to the Aqsa mosque, executing Talmudic programs inside, and preventing female Jerusalemite marabout from entering to Aqsa (Hammad, 2015).

Some activists shared posts and tweets of the last posts of the martyrs on their social media pages, including what Muhannad Al Halabi, who stabbed three settlers, killing two of them and injuring another (Beaumont, 2015), tweeted: “as I see, the third Intifada has commenced, what happens to the Aqsa, our sanctities, and the place of our prophet’s Israa, what happens to women of Aqsa is what happens to our mothers and sisters, I don’t think the people will accept humiliation, people will repel, yes they will”. Another tweet by the martyr Fadi Alwan declaring his intent to die as a martyr reads: “By the name of Allah the most Merciful, Oh Allah, I intended to die as a martyr, or win in faith of Allah, Oh Allah, forgive my sins as well as those of all believers and Muslims, I intended to repent, Allah willing, and to die as a martyr, Allah is the All mighty” (Hammad, 2015).

The run-over operations have wide echoes in the social media, the phrase “Daes” was one of the most circulated words then, Palestinian and Arab activists expressed their solidarity toward the run-over settlers operations in Jerusalem and Hebron. The number of members of the “Daes” page on facebook reached 20,000 within 36 hours (Arnaout, winter 2015, p. 131). These internet posts provided an encouraging atmosphere for individuals to attempt attacks, leading to a series of frequent stabbing that produced a state of panic among all Israeli entities (Afaneh, 2015).

The nature of Intifada acts indicates the level of courage, and willingness to sacrifice among Palestinian youth, they attend to execute operations in stabbing a well-armed soldier with no fear or hesitation, knowing that the outcome will be either dying as martyrs or being captured by the occupation police. In contrast, the Israeli soldiers and settlers feel anxious and fearful of their lives, despite the fact that they have firearms (Atwi, 2016). What increases the concerns of the Zionist security services is the lack of information about who stands behind these frequent operations. Amos Harel (Haaretz) sees that the majority of these operations are the product of individual initiatives even in the cases when the attacker is a known member of one of the Palestinians parties or groups, however, it has been found that they acted based on personal decisions, not based on decisions made by the group to which they pertain (Atwi, 2016).

4.3.3 Tools and Means

Intifada always improves its means and tools. Each Intifada is unique in terms of weapons, tools and methods, especially due to the scarcity and limitation of tools because of the intensive security measures, strict follow-up and pursuits, continuous extensive arrests and restrains that aim at stopping and undermining the Intifada. However, Palestinians in their Intifada always find alternatives and never surrender or despair. They, rather, innovate(?), accommodate to the status quo and invent methods that suit the new circumstances and endure in the face of challenges, making the occupation authorities unable to fight or confront (Leddawi, 2015).

For now, it is enough to distinguish three of them: fighting tools, communications tools, and economical tools. The cold weapons come first in the group of fighting tools used by Intifada people, it includes the knives, cleavers, hatchets, penknives, as well as screwdrivers, awl and other sharp metals (Ismail, 2014; Leddawi, 2015). These are all used in stabbing, while cars are used for running over and stones are used to throw as an expression of denial of the occupation, and assuring that the battle with it is a battle of will. In general, these stabbing and running over operations are the most prominent means in terms of fighting in the third Intifada. The social media, Facebook and Twitter, and every hash-tag that carries the words Jerusalem, Aqsa or Intifada, come first with the communication tools used for the first time in Intifada (Hammad, 2015; Akhbar el-Watan, 2015). The east Jerusalemite boycott of West Jerusalem and abstinence from buying their goods is the main economical tools used to confront the occupation authority (Arnaout, 2015 Winter, p. 136).

There is no doubt that these various tools agitated panic among Israelis, while using these tools in unexpected operations relieves Palestinians and makes them proud of the idea that the Intifada has commenced as Amos Harel (Haaretz) says (Al-Akhbar, 2016). This made Israelis refrain from exiting their houses, a lot of them do not go to work, parks, or worship fearing that they may get stabbed or run over. The images of the attack on a Jewish synagogue in Jerusalem about a year, before the commencement of Intifada of 2015 (Arnaout, winter 2015, p. 131), are still in their minds, as well as the daily stabbings and run over attacks. The Israeli Minister of Finance, Yair Lapid, expressed his fears of the economic boycott (Salama, 2015, p. 120).

4.3.4 Zionist Reaction

When suppressing Intifada, the occupation authority prefer to seclude a region from the rest. They divide Palestine to five regions: Jerusalem, Gaza strip, Northern Bank, Southern Bank, and 1948 occupied lands. Because they are targeting Jerusalemites, Jerusalem neighbourhoods and Aqsa, using all sorts of suppression and tyranny, they make sure not to open new confrontations in the rest of the Palestinian region unless they have to. They follow the mass punishment policy against Palestinians in Jerusalem, they escalate their tyrannical acts following each stabbing or run over operation held by a young man or woman. Israeli soldiers commit assassinations of Intifada activists and commit savage field executions of attackers (Atwi, 2016). In addition, Israelis do stab Palestinians too (The Palestinian Intifada, n.d.). the occupation authority is now intensively using metal detectors (Afaneh, 2015). They even fixed surveillance cameras on the light posts. They chased young people and humiliatingly inspected them to prevent them from sitting on the stairs of the Damascus Gate (Bab Al Amoud), as well as cutting the surrounding olive trees, as this was the location of the third Intifada commencement (Arnaout, spring 2016, p. 162).

The occupation authority, however, prefers to present facilitations in other regions, such as discussing providing technological facilitations in the west bank and Gaza, allowing Palestinian contractors to work inside Israel, and allowing about 33 thousand Palestinian workers to enter inside the green line (Abu Qamar, 2016), as they do not want the Intifada to expand to the West bank and the 1948 regions. Thus, they make sure to settle things on the west bank through the economic privileges called for by General Yoav Morvai in dealing with merchants of Hebron, especially after failing to use force to suppress Intifada and its expansion in its sixth month. Thus, they push toward reviving the idea of economic peace, to create economic atmosphere and a state of welfare in the west bank to mitigate the effects of Intifada and working to resolve it gradually so they can seclude the Jerusalemites (Abu Qamar, 2016).

With respect to the Palestinian Authority in Rammalah, the Israeli entity is used to using the stick and carrot method according to the level of accordance with the authority to security coordination and cooperation in failing the attacks of the Intifada. Netanyahu uses the economical peace policy as a pressing tool on the authority besides the force he put in dealing with it (Abu Qamar, 2016). Consequently, the authority is threatened to cease in case they opted for the Intifada option rather than the negotiation option.

In order to explore the reactions and views of some Israeli writers toward Intifada, Yoav Shaham concludes, in a survey about the level of support of the third Intifada, that the majority of the west bank citizens supports the continuity of the Intifada, however, they are against the stabbing attempts. As a result of the conversion from a political and national conflict to a religious conflict, says Ariel Kleiner (News1 website). He recommends a comprehensive war on Aqsa and Palestinians, as well as closing the Aqsa to conclude this religious conflict (Abu Atta, 2016). While Amos Harel (Haaretz) criticizes the weakness of the suppression and repression staffs employed by both Israeli and the Palestinian Authority to tame these fierce confrontations. Israelis are promoting to the idea that most Palestinians do not see a Palestinian interest in the Intifada, while the Israeli right considers the Palestinian authority as an anti-Israeli system that must be eliminated (Abu Atta, 2016).

From the perspective of propaganda and misleading, the Israeli vision focuses either on depicting the current status as a state of violence (Pulver, 2015), and that the government is taking measures to overcome this, and then present proposals to repress the Intifada and abort it. Or that the country, as Netanyahu declares, is facing

a wave of terrorism that is nursed by incorrect systematic incitation of the Palestinian authority in the west bank and the Islamic movement in Israel. In addition, to Hamas and the Palestinian Authority, the Islamic movement was responsible of spreading lies about Israeli intentions toward the Aqsa. Netanyahu namely mentioned MK Haneen Zoabi as the one who asked thousands of prayers to head to the site to inhibit an Israeli conspiracy to shed the blood of the east Jerusalem inhabitants. He also mentioned that he requested the general attorney to start a criminal investigation against Zoabi. While, Silvan Shalom, the Interior Minister is considering withdrawing citizenship from Israeli Arabs who participated in the attacks and rip off the residence rights of these existing in east Jerusalem (Al-Watan, 2015).

4.3.5 The Intifada Environment

The environment of the third Intifada is basically the nursing environment of the Palestinian and Arab levels, as the intrinsic factors are the fundamental grounds for the Intifada supporting environment. As this nursing environment is in a retrogressive state, the internal Palestinian and regional Arabic aspects and their negative effects on Intifada cannot be omitted.

On the Palestinian level, we find that the Palestinians dividing and the weakness of the Palestinian authority and its retrogressive state resulting from the Israeli pressures of elimination and cessation, as well as its leaders opting for the negotiation rather than Intifada, the continuous security coordination with the occupation authority and the continuous efforts to stop the Intifada, and thwarting attempts to execute operations against occupation authority and settlers, all produced huge weak points of the third Intifada, and are considered its major local suppressor. Therefore, the security cooperation with the Zionist entity leads to the loss of legitimacy of Abbas and the PA leadership in the eyes of the Palestinians (Kirchofer, 2015). The Palestinian security services have repressed 200 attacks since the commencement of the Intifada, which were targeting Israeli targets (Al-Arabid, 2016). The fallouts of division between Fatah and Hamas are shedding their negative shadows, the third Intifada is supported by Hamas, but not Fatah. Thus, the Palestinian division is a major weak point that obstructs the efforts to counterfeit Jerusalem and Aqsa Judaizing. In addition to the bad economic status that held Palestinians to an economic matrix that is controlled by the occupation authority, the occupation authorities may stop tax returns at their disposal as well as the income resources of the Palestinian authority, converting the Palestinian citizens' concern to an individual economic living one rather than a general national one with collective basic solutions (Abu Jabara, 2015). The Palestinians division has become unprecedentedly scattering, as larger division started between the militia of the PLO and Islamic forces, followed by another split in each front, Fatah is on one side and the national front on the other, while the disagreement between Hamas and Jihad movements became more prominent. Even inside Fatah, a split occurred between Mahmoud Abbas and Mohammed Dahlan and other third wing. Hamas is split between the leaderships inside Palestine and those outside. The narrow interests of the divisions always dominate over public interests. Hamas wants to mobilize the west bank front to ease themselves in heavily wounded Gaza strip. Fatah on the other hand is split in its perspective, but the most prominent one is calling for slowing down and easing not to abort or neglect the diplomatic victories the authority market for (Abu Jabara, 2015). In response to the Zionist violations in Aqsa, Abbas was content asking for international Aqsa and Jerusalem protection. The Westerners look to Abbas as the most moderate leader of the Palestinian national movement (Goldberg, 2015). In response, Marwan Barghouti criticized the failure of the Palestinian leadership in capturing the Intifada aims considering that the need to the national discourse based on the grounds of national unity and finding a new political elite are the best way to confront the difficulties of this stage (Al-Barghouti, 2016, p. 8). In the same context, Jamil Hilal introduces his vision of the disassembly of the Palestinian political entity since Oslo, pointing to the failure of the PLO, Fatah, and Hamas, or what can be called the official Palestinian failure due to the control of Hamas over Gaza and the conflict between Fatah and Hamas as well as the split of their divisions (Hilal, 2016).

On the Arabic level, due to the weakness status of Arab countries, as well as the preoccupation of Arab countries with their internal strife, there was an unprecedented regression in Arabic contribution to the

Palestinian cause. The preoccupation of the Arab street with internal fighting and the Arabic official silence as well as the absence of the Arabic reaction and weakness were major factors that participated in the Israeli aggravation, and encouraged the Jews to accelerate implementing their plans. It seems that the Intifada youth was relying on the change in the Arab countries, but what things ended up with in Syria, Iraq, Lebanon, Libya, and Egypt (Abu Jabara, 2015), have founded an environment that suppressed the Intifada rather than nursing it.

4.3.6 Attributes of Intifada

Just like the Intifada phenomenon in general, the third Intifada is characterized by spontaneous rise; however, it did not revert to the organizational characteristic and unified leadership. It, as seen by Catherine Philip, has no leadership, individualized with individual attempts, lack planning, and no one knows when or where the attacks may take place (Ismail, 2014; Carlstrom, 2015). It is an Intifada held by a new generation (Hearst, 2015). Noticeable in its attributes is that the battle of will resides in action and reaction, i.e., as the Israelis use more force, the Jerusalemite reaction becomes more intense (Arnaout, winter 2015, p. 139) Another attribute of this Intifada is that it fights the racist policies, characterized by comprehensiveness, escalation and continuity. It is a soft Intifada, says Amos Gilboa (Abu Atta, 2016) that comes as a result of maturing subjective autonomic conditions and not made through decisions (Salama, 2015, p. 117).

Another attribute of this Intifada is the confidentiality before, during and after any operation, which makes the Israeli security agencies unable to find a lead on the entity behind these operations. In addition, carrying or owning the weapons used in these operations cannot be easily prohibited, as knives, and cars are a means used by every man at home and on the streets. The young people who execute these attacks is of a new generation that has no previous security record at the Israeli Security Services, nor at the Palestinian ones (Atwi, 2016). These important elements clarify the success of the young to achieve their goals and execute these operations, and, the reason why the occupation authorities admit the difficulty of stopping the stabbing and run over operations, despite the intensive spread of Israeli militants, policemen, security agents, roadblocks, and increased surveillance on all passages, roads, public places and markets (Atwi, 2016; Abu Jabara, 2015).

4.4 The Future of the Aqsa Mosque

So, if we speculate the status of Jerusalem and the Aqsa mosque, within the Palestinian dividing circumstances and the weakness of the Palestinian Authority, and under the disturbances among the Arab world (Qersh, 2015, p. 103; Williams, 2015), we will find, reaching the middle of 2016, a pessimistic vision of the future of the Aqsa Mosque and Jerusalem city.

Here, a question arises: is there any way out of this pessimistic view, that shapes a surviving tool for the city of Jerusalem and the Aqsa mosque, pushing toward a more optimistic view that can be translated into facts, acts, and tangible policies that succeed in confronting the Judaizing and various Zionist threats to the Islamic sanctities of more than one billion Muslims?

No doubt the first condition will be not only stop the state of the divide inside the Palestinian systems, on the level of relations between parties like Fatah and Hamas, and in the same party among Abbasis and Dahlanis and maybe the Marwanis inside Fatah, and between the PLO and the Islamic parties, but also the total agreement on a unified strategy to tackle power in the Palestinian political institution (presidency, government, the PLO, and the legislative council). It also involves finishing the dispute and divide and, according to Marwan Barghouti, reinstating the national unity and producing a new political elite that gathers the national discourse that is held by our values (Al-Barghouti, 2016, p. 7), based on the support of the Intifada, and referring the negotiation option to the Intifada option, not the opposite. This means, according to Jamil Hilal, ending the disruption state in the Palestinian political field since Oslo (Hilal, 2016).

The second condition is the end of the current crises of the regional Arab systems. It is essential to treat the

political instability state resulting from the fight over power between civilians and militants, and meeting the demands of nations calling for their freedom. It is crucial to confront the sectarianism, and prevent the blatant interference in the Arab countries affairs led by a regional power like Iran, in order to impose its hegemony on the Gulf and the Arab region, spread Shi'ism and restore the glories of the Safavid state. This has resulted in Iran controlling four Arab countries: Iraq, Syria, Lebanon, and Yemen, with the rise of Hezbollah, which acts as an arm of Iran which plays an influential role in the unrest status in the Arab countries as well as controlling the vital locations of the Lebanese government and totally controlling it (Jweidah, 2015; Adelman, 2015). It is important for the Arab countries, too, to confront or mitigate the interference of the world's great powers and the creative chaos, division, and partitioning they impose on the Arab nation, for the benefit of the Zionist entity (Qersh, 2015, p. 103).

There is no doubt that these are two crucial conditions to confront the attempts to Judaize Jerusalem and the Aqsa mosque. However, the speculative view of the future of Aqsa involves a mixture of optimistic and pessimistic views together. Pessimism may dominate optimism considering two reasons: first, lack of horizons to remedy the autonomic factors on the Palestinian and Arab levels in the near future, second, the keenness of the Zionist entity to exploit this "historic moment" to continue Judaizing Islamic land sanctities. Optimism may, also, dominate pessimism with the continuing Palestinian and Arab nations Intifada in the face of occupation and tyranny.

To sum up, the future of the Aqsa mosque, Jerusalem and its neighbourhoods, and Jerusalemites depend on the unity of Arabs and Palestinians, overcoming their disputes and problems, and preventing any interference of regional and great powers in their affairs.

4.5 Conclusion

According to that, the Israeli occupation authority increased the ongoing attempts for Judaizing Aqsa Mosque through following many negative actions against the mosque such as; control of doors and patios, allow Jews to pray in it, prevent the Palestinians from praying in it, close the mosque sometimes, and continue the excavations under the mosque. These Israeli negative actions are the main reason of escalating the third Intifada.

Finally, the rational result of all of this is that the Aqsa mosque, the ascension of the Prophet Muhammad, peace be upon him, is at serious risk. This is a reason for Muslims, Arabs and Palestinians to take such steps and measures seriously, and if they stay negative, weak, and divided, someday they will find themselves facing a gravely missed dire consequence.

The Zionists will always have the pretexts, in addition to the support of the international powers that will not let them down in case they start dividing the Aqsa and building the Jewish synagogue, or even demolishing the Aqsa and building the Third Temple. Thus, the only way is to unite, hold fast to the Rope of Allah, and be not divided.

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