Objective - The objective of this study was to investigate empirically the relationship between the compensation of chief executive officers (CEO) and a firm's performance in the banking industry and to examine if CEO compensation affects bank performance differently between banks with and without prospect.

Methodology/Technique - The author uses two measures of performance, total return on assets and Tobin, s Q, and concentrate on total CEO compensation. All data are collected from annual reports of banks listed in Indonesia Stock Exchange for a sample of 23 commercial banks or 167 firm-year observation over the 2009-2018 period utilizing the purposive random sampling technique. CEO compensation and bank performance are then analysed employing pooled regression method.

Finding - This study finds supporting evidence for the agency-related problem in the banking industry in Indonesia. It then proves that high CEO compensation does have an inverse effect on bank performance, mainly on firm value. It also provides evidence that the pay-performance also demonstrates different patterns in firms with and without prospect.

Novelty - This study uses novel and hand-collected data on CEO compensation in the banking industry and developing econometric evidence regarding CEO pay-performance relating to banks with and without prospect.

Type of Paper - Empirical.

Keywords: CEO compensation; Financial performance; banking industry.

JEL Classification:M41 G21, G32, M12.

URI: http://gatrenterprise.com/GATRJournals/AFR/vol5.3_2.html

DOI: https://doi.org/10.35609/afr.2020.5.3(2)

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